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Non-technical summary 
Gaining access to technological assets and patents, in particular, has long been a 
major motive and objective for firm acquisitions. Firms acquiring the patents 
underlying a technology may, however, do so for different reasons. On the one hand, 
firms might be interested in the technological value of a patent. By employing 
technology from external sources, acquiring firms aim to develop innovative products 
or services that lead to higher firm value. On the other hand, patents can also be used 
strategically. Their strategic use may result in “patent fences” that could block 
competitors in their innovation activities. Technological assets in mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) hence exhibit two faces: portfolio building and/or (un-)blocking 
in technology markets. As a consequence, both aspects should therefore drive the 
acquirer’s willingness to pay for a target firm. Drawing on transaction costs theory 
and the resource-based view of the firm, this paper is intended to increase our 
understanding of the motivation and objectives of acquiring firms with regard to 
technology. The main argument is that firms drawing upon a concentrated pool of 
technology can safeguard their research and development (R&D) investment more 
effectively if they can take control over key patents in a technology field. We pay 
particular attention to the value of technology as a blocking instrument and contribute 
to the literature on patent indicators by proposing a new measure to assess the 
blocking potential of patents. Our results are based on a sample of 479 European firms 
that were subject to horizontal acquisitions in the period from 1999 to 2003. With 
respect to technology we find a positive effect of the volume and the value of a 
target’s patents. Focusing on the strategic dimension of technology acquisitions, our 
results indicate that acquirers also deliberately strive to get access to patents with a 
blocking potential, especially if these are related to the acquirer’s own technology 
portfolio. This may suggest that firm acquisitions are used to unblock ongoing R&D 
activities. Our results have implications for policy makers, in that M&A transactions 
may considerably decrease competition in technology markets. Merger control 
authorities should ideally take this into account. Moreover, managers need to pay 
close attention to the market for corporate control and monitor the technological 
assets transferred from target to acquirer and vice versa as this might lead to the 
establishment of a patent fence. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Ein wichtiges Ziel von Fusionen und Übernahmen („mergers and acquisitions“, 
M&A) ist es, Zugang zu technologischem Wissen zu erlangen. Einerseits dienen 
Patente, die solcher Technologie zugrunde liegen, im Wesentlichen der Ergänzung 
des Technologieportfolios des Käuferunternehmens. Mit Hilfe extern verfügbarer 
Technologie streben Käuferunternehmen danach, innovative Produkte und 
Dienstleistungen zu entwickeln, die wiederum den Unternehmenswert steigern. 
Andererseits können Patente jedoch auch strategisch eingesetzt werden. Solch ein 
strategischer Nutzen kann in so genannten „patent fences“ („Patentzäunen“) liegen, 
die Innovationsaktivitäten von Wettbewerbern blockieren. Die Akquisition von 
Patenten im Zuge von M&A-Aktivitäten hat somit zwei Gesichter: Sie dienen einmal 
der Ergänzung des Patentportfolis, zum zweiten aber auch der Blockierung bzw. 
Auflösung von „patent fences“ in Technologiemärkten. Von beiden Aspekten kann 
daher ein Einfluss auf die Zahlungsbereitschaft des Käuferunternehmens für das Ziel 
erwartet werden. Der vorliegende Aufsatz trägt zu einem besseren Verständnis der 
Motivation und der Ziele von erwerbenden Unternehmen im Hinblick auf 
technologisches Wissen bei. Durch die besondere Berücksichtigung von Technologie 
als ein Blockadeinstrument leisten wir einen Beitrag zur Literatur über 
Patentindikatoren, indem wir ein neues Maß zur Bestimmung des Blockadepotenzials 
von Patenten vorschlagen. Unsere Ergebnisse basieren auf einer Stichprobe von 479 
europäischen M&A-Transaktionen im Zeitraum von 1999 bis 2003. Sie zeigen einen 
positiven Effekt von Technologien auf den Transaktionswert. Darüber hinaus zeigen 
wir, dass Käuferunternehmen in der Lage sind, sowohl die Patentqualität als auch das 
Blockadepotenzial der Technologien einzuschätzen und zu bewerten. Käufer sind 
dabei insbesondere an solchen Technologien interessiert, die ein hohes 
Blockadepotenzial wie auch eine hohe Verwandtschaft zu den bereits vom Käufer 
genutzten Technologien aufweisen. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass M&A-
Transaktionen den Wettbewerb in Technologiemärkten bedeutend verringern können, 
was auch von Fusionskontrollbehörden beachtet werden sollte. Darüber hinaus sollte 
das Management von Unternehmen M&A-Aktivitäten genau beobachten, um ein 
Entstehen von „patent fences“ möglichst frühzeitig zu verhindern. 
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1 Introduction 
The acquisition of external technologies as a complement to in-house research and 
technology development has frequently been shown to be vital to firm performance 
and economic growth (Kogut and Zander, 1992). Along with technology alliances 
(Teece, 1992, Hagedoorn, 1993, Mowery et al., 1996) and licensing agreements 
(Teece, 1986), the acquisition of innovative firms has, for a number of years, been a 
major tool for accessing externally developed technologies (Capron et al., 1998, 
Graebner, 2004). By employing technology from external sources, firms aim to 
develop innovative products or services that lead to improved firm value (Griliches, 
1981; Pakes, 1985). Acquired technologies can also be a decisive factor for post-
merger innovation performance in technology motivated acquisitions (Ahuja and 
Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006; Colombo et al., 2006). A firm’s patent portfolio, in 
particular, can be assumed to have a direct influence on innovative capacities 
(Mansfield, 1986). Intellectual property rights (IPR) such as patents are hence an 
important factor for the merger decision (Veugelers, 2006). This implies that firm 
acquisitions can also be used strategically. Acquirers who gain control over important 
patents may be able to erect or break down barriers to entry and exert market power in 
technology markets (Reinganum, 1983; Mukherjee et al., 2004). From this it follows 
that a firm’s IPR strategy is closely knit with its mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
strategy (Cassiman et al., 2005; Lesser, 1998; Graff et al., 2003, for the biotech 
industry). While resource-based explanations, focusing on complementarity of 
resources and synergistic potentials, have received considerable attention in the 
academic literature (e.g., Harrison et al., 1991, 2001; Capron et al., 1998), only little 
is known about the importance of strategic technology acquisition motives. 
Given the importance of technologies and patents in M&A we use firm acquisitions as 
an exemplary channel for assessing technologies to study the value of acquired 
technologies. In this paper, we argue that technology acquisitions exhibit “two faces”: 
building the acquirer’s technology portfolio and blocking competitors in technology 
markets. The building or resource-based motivation emphasizes the combinatory 
potential of the merging partners’ research and development (R&D) resources, which 
could enable efficiency gains through the exploitation of scale and scope economies 
in R&D (Kamien and Schwartz, 1982; Cohen and Levin, 1989). Additionally, 
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researchers have argued that such transactions can be used to reconfigure the 
acquirer’s or target’s business, in order to respond to changes in the competitive 
environment or to enhance and improve existing operations (e.g., Bowman and Singh, 
1993; Capron et al., 1998; Capron and Hulland, 1999). Reconfiguring the business 
goes along with a redeployment of resources which, in case of R&D, may involve 
IPR, personnel, laboratories and technical instruments being physically transferred to 
new locations or used in different R&D projects. Moreover, the combination of two 
product or technology portfolios provides an opportunity to exploit complementarities 
(Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Colombo et al., 2006) that result from a skilled unbundling 
and bundling of resources with the objective of enhancing (technological) core 
competencies of the merged entity (Cassiman et al., 2005; Sorescu et al., 2007). In 
other words, technology acquisitions allow extra returns to be appropriated from 
innovation activities through an enhanced, more valuable resource base (Barney, 
1991).  
Alternatively, technology acquisitions can be used strategically, as a means of taking 
control over IPR and especially patents. As patents grant the holder the right to 
exclude third parties from using the protected technology, ownership of IPR can be 
used to block competitors’ innovation activities (Cohen et al., 2000; Ziedonis, 2004; 
Scotchmer, 2004; Blind et al., 2006; Heeley et al., 2007). Accordingly, control over 
key IPR can be an essential factor to maintain or enhance a firm’s position in 
technology markets. Against the background of a surge in patenting over the past 
decades at the world’s major patent offices, the patent landscape nowadays is 
characterized by marginal inventions, overlapping claims and multiple patent 
ownerships for complementary technologies (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998), as well as 
by patent fences of substitute technologies owned by a single firm or a group of firms 
(Cohen et al., 2000). Successfully navigating through these “patent thickets” (Shapiro, 
2001) and dealing with patent fences (Schneider, 2008) can be a decisive factor in 
firms’ strategic planning. In response to this development, acquisitions of IPR and 
their enforcement have increased which led to “overfencing” in IP markets (David, 
2001). As a consequence, some firms “underinvest” in R&D if it would mean having 
to license technology from multiple owners (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998) or if a 
technology fence hinders further research. Other firms aim to access “blocking 
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patents” through M&A (Graff et al., 2003) or engage in collaborative agreements such 
as licensing and patent pools (Merges, 2001).  
Little is known from empirical research about the strategic value of patents. Using the 
example of M&A activities, this paper contributes to the understanding of the value of 
strategic technology acquisition. Acquiring firms striving for key technologies might 
either want to block competitors in technology markets or to “unlock” an existing 
patent fence which – as a consequence – would enable the acquirer to continue or 
expand ongoing R&D work (O'Donoghue et al., 1998; Lerner et al., 2003; Graff et 
al., 2003). An example for an acquisition that was motivated by gaining access to a 
“blocked” technology is the case of the German optical instrument manufacturer Carl 
Zeiss that acquired the laser division of the British company BioRad (Competition 
Commission (UK), 2004). The merger followed a number of patent disputes between 
Carl Zeiss and BioRad and its most important competitors, among them Leica and 
Cornell. Cornell invented and patented an outstanding multiphoton technology, which 
was the leading technology in the field and exclusively licensed out to BioRad. 
Hence, the acquisition of BioRad granted Carl Zeiss access to a highly valuable, 
before-hand “blocked” technology.  
Drawing on the resource-based view of the firm, transaction cost economics and 
recent advances in research on IPR, we argue that patents are of special interest for 
the acquiring firm if they exhibit particular technological features, such as being 
related to the acquiring firm’s technology fields or having a high technological value. 
Moreover, firms commercializing technologies that draw upon a concentrated pool of 
valuable patents should be able to safeguard their investment more effectively than 
others. This should especially be the case for patents with a blocking potential, as they 
are most threatening to rent appropriation from R&D investments. This strategic value 
as well as the technological value of patents should both be reflected in the acquirer’s 
willingness to pay for the target firm. To the best of our knowledge, no comparative 
evidence has yet been gathered on these “two faces” of technology acquisition. This 
paper is hence intended to increase our understanding of the motivation and objectives 
of acquiring firms with regard to technology and technology acquisition in general.  
In that we pay particular attention to the value of patented technologies as blocking 
instruments, we contribute to the literature on patent indicators (Trajtenberg, 1990; 
Trajtenberg et al., 1997; Trajtenberg et al., 2000; Harhoff et al., 2003; Harhoff et al., 
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2005a2005b). We suggest a measure to assess the blocking potential of patents, which 
is based on detailed information about patent applications at the European Patent 
Office (EPO). We test the importance of the “two faces” of patents based on a sample 
of 479 European firms that were subject to horizontal acquisitions in the period from 
1999 to 2003. Our findings provide support for both building and blocking. They 
suggest a positive effect of the volume of technologies a target owns – represented by 
the patent stock of the target – on the deal value. Accounting for patent quality – in 
terms of citations received by other patents – our findings show that acquiring firms 
are paying a premium for high-quality technologies. Focusing on the purely strategic 
dimension of technology acquisitions, our results indicate that acquirers also 
deliberately strive to get access to patents with a blocking potential in technology 
markets. In line with our prediction, the price paid is even higher when such a 
technology is closely related to the acquirer’s own technology portfolio. This suggests 
that firm acquisitions are used to leverage control over key technologies that can 
create a competitive advantage by unlocking ongoing R&D activities or by blocking 
competitors’ R&D. Based on our findings, we derive important implications for 
managers and competition authorities.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines our 
theoretical considerations and establishes a set of hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the 
data set we use and presents descriptive statistics. The empirical test of our 
hypotheses is provided in section 4. The last section concludes with policy and 
managerial implications of our study, provides a critical evaluation of the study and 
points out potential areas for further research. 
2 Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development 
Although the acquisition of innovative firms has frequently been shown to be a major 
tool for accessing externally developed technologies (e.g., Capron et al., 1998, 
Graebner, 2004), we cannot always assume that M&As are an attractive means of 
accessing valuable technological resources. As opposed to arm’s-length technology 
licensing contracts, M&As typically result – at least to some degree – in the 
integration of the merging firms, which comes at the price of high coordination costs. 
From a transaction cost perspective, M&As should hence only occur if the benefits of 
an internal exploitation of technologies – for building and blocking purposes – exceed 
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the costs of coordinating assets within one company (Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 
1979).  
In general, this cost of governance argument suggests that licensing contracts are 
preferable to M&As. Focusing on IPR in acquisitions might, however, change the 
picture. The coordination of intangible assets is in several ways more challenging than 
the coordination of “traditional“, tangible assets (Arora et al., 2001). Although patents 
(and other IPR) facilitate bargaining in technology markets tremendously by granting 
temporary monopoly rights, i.e. ownership rights, on technological inventions to the 
inventors, patents are still difficult to value, their boundaries are often blurry and 
difficult to define, and parties owning related, previously patented technologies are 
often unknown in advance (Merges and Nelson, 1990).1 Furthermore, markets for 
technology are increasingly characterized by fragmentation, multiple ownership, 
overlapping claims, patent thickets and patent fences, leaving patenting firms in an 
opaque and uncertain environment (Ziedonis, 2004). This leads to several problems 
for trading IPR at arm’s length (Arora et al., 1999; Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; 
Somaya and Teece, 2000; Graff et al., 2003). First, fragmented technology markets 
and blurry IPR boundaries lead to diffuse entitlement problems (Heller and Eisenberg, 
1998). Second, the difficulty of valuing IPR leads to value allocation problems 
between the technology owner and the licensee (Graff et al., 2003). Third, the 
dynamic and uncertain environment of technology markets causes difficulties setting 
up and enforcing the contract, due to monitoring and metering problems (Ziedonis, 
2004). Lastly, there are strategic problems that can arise if IPR are traded at arm’s 
length. For example, rent-dissipation effects can result when technologies are licensed 
out to other firms, because the licensees become new competitors in product markets 
(Graff et al., 2003). All the problems associated with arm’s-length contracts increase 
their transaction costs in absolute and relative terms as compared to more integrative 
solutions such as M&As. 
In a scenario as described above, transaction cost theory shows that simple contracts 
cannot prevent hold-up problems in the market for IPR because IPR cannot be 
transferred without a significant loss in value (Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1985; 
                                                 
1 There is an ongoing debate on the optimal design of patents (their optimal length and breadth) in the theoretical 
literature in order to maximize incentives to innovate in the economy (Scotchmer, 1991; Scotchmer and Green, 
1990; Scotchmer, 2004). 
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Ziedonis, 2004). As a consequence, we observe that some firms underinvest in R&D 
while others internalize transactions involving IPR. For the latter firms, the degree of 
integration depends on the trade-off between the expected gains and losses of the 
different means of accessing a technology, from non-exclusive licensing to firm 
acquisitions. The fact that previous studies found a strong technology-based 
motivation behind M&As shows that the expected costs of coordination are often 
lower than the transaction costs of licensing in dynamic and uncertain technology 
markets. 
Previous empirical literature has shown that technological assets contribute 
significantly to the value of a firm acquisition (see Veugelers, 2006, for a survey). 
Hence, M&As exhibit a good example to study the value and nature of different 
dimensions of technology acquisition. In the following, we will draw from the 
literature on the resource-based view of the firm (e.g., Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 
1991) as well as on transaction cost economics (Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1979) 
to hypothesize that the technological and the strategic values of patents are important 
in firm acquisitions. 
2.1 Portfolio building and the technological value of patents 
In the previous section we argued that M&As are an attractive tool to access 
technological assets and especially patents as has been found in the previous empirical 
literature (Veugelers, 2006). In this section we summarize the main technology-
related merger objectives that have been described from a resource-based perspective 
on M&As and technologies. Previous studies have shown that the value that can be 
created through technology acquisitions is higher if the merged entity succeeds in 
exploiting the combinatory potential of resources and, in particular, potential 
complementarities (Singh and Montgomery, 1987; Barney, 1988; Harrison et al., 
1991, 2001; Hitt et al., 2001). In order to realize complementarity effects by 
combining two technology portfolios, acquiring firms presumably screen technology 
markets carefully, as they should be interested in those acquisition targets that will 
most effectively complement their technology portfolio (Frey and Hussinger, 2006). 
They are hence interested in acquisition targets with a particular technology and IPR 
profile. Resource-based theory suggests that complementarity effects between 
acquirer and target result from bundling strategic resources into unique and valuable 
combinations (Barney, 1991; Conner, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). Through the process of 
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resource redeployment (Capron et al., 1998; Capron and Hulland, 1999) a merged 
entity may thus create a new or improved set of capabilities, providing the basis for 
superior firm performance and competitive advantage (Penrose, 1959; Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000; Priem and Butler, 2001; Sorescu et al., 2007).  
The value of an external technology portfolio as presumably sensed by the acquiring 
firm can then be split up into different components: the size of the acquired 
knowledge base (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006), the quality of each 
technology (Reitzig, 2003; Grimpe and Hussinger, 2008) and the relatedness to the 
acquiring firm’s technology portfolio (Harrison et al., 1991, 2001; Ahuja and Katila, 
2001; Cloodt et al., 2006). A patent portfolio, first of all, acts as a signal as it shows 
that the prospective target firm has proven its technological expertise and capabilities 
and that it has a well-functioning laboratory and inventor team (Ndofor and Levitas, 
2004; Levitas and McFadyen, 2006; Heeley et al., 2007). The larger the patent stock, 
the higher the acquisition target’s technological productivity. Furthermore, the 
knowledge base of the then merged firm increases through the acquisition. Significant 
gains from the combination and joint exploitation of both patent portfolios can be 
expected. The increase in the firm’s internal knowledge base can lead to a higher 
innovation output or “better quality” inventions. Finally, the enhanced knowledge 
base increases the absorptive capacity of the merged firm. Absorptive capacity is 
generally developed as a by-product of a firm’s own R&D activities (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1989, 1990). It is made up of three major components: the identification of 
valuable technological knowledge in the environment, its assimilation with existing 
knowledge stocks and the final exploitation for successful innovation. Absorptive 
capacity hence increases awareness of market and technology trends, which can be 
translated into pre-emptive actions (Bowman and Hurry, 1993). As a result, it enables 
firms to predict future developments more accurately (Cohen and Levinthal, 1994). 
These benefits should be reflected in a higher willingness to pay for the target firm. 
Hypothesis 1: The price paid for an acquisition target increases with the target’s 
patent stock. 
In addition to the size of the acquired technology portfolio, the quality of the acquired 
patents is thought to be an important driver of the acquisition decision. The 
distribution of patent values has been shown to be highly skewed, with most of the 
patents having a very low value (Harhoff et al., 1999; Harhoff et al., 2003). The 
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quality of the acquired patent portfolio should matter as well as its size. One reason 
for this is that patents can be sold individually after the acquisition and valuable 
patents are associated with a higher price or licensing value. Another reason why 
patent quality is relevant is that highly valuable patents might have a higher impact on 
the firm’s post-merger innovation outcome and increase the merged entity’s 
absorptive capacity to a larger extent than less valuable patents. Our second 
hypothesis hence reads: 
Hypothesis 2: The price paid for an acquisition target increases with the value of the 
target’s patents. 
Lastly, technological relatedness has been identified as an important factor in 
technology M&As (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cassiman et al., 2005; Cloodt et al., 
2006). Analogously to product market relatedness, technological relatedness involves 
economies of scale and scope in R&D. Drawing from the concept of absorptive 
capacity, firms with related technological skills can presumably learn more from each 
other than firms active in completely different technology areas. Previous literature 
suggests, however, that the gains from a merger with a firm with too similar a 
technology portfolio might be relatively small, as there might be little to learn from a 
partner with the same technology profile (Harrison et al., 1991, 2001; Ahuja and 
Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006). In line with previous literature, we hypothesize that 
M&A partners can get the maximum out of sharing their knowledge if they are active 
in technologically related areas which are also different to a certain extent: 
Hypothesis 3: The price paid for an acquisition target increases with technological 
relatedness up to a certain threshold, after which it decreases (inverted U shape). 
In the next section, we turn to the second “face” in the valuation of technology, which 
is the blocking potential of the acquired technology.2 
                                                 
2 It should be mentioned that the acquisition of highly valuable patents and patents in related technology fields can 
also be viewed as strategic in the sense that a highly valuable patent can generate significant licensing income or 
that a large pool of patents in a certain technology field can strengthen the firm’s position in technology 
acquisition. In this paper, we subsume patent quality and technological relatedness under resource-based 
technology acquisition motives to distinguish them from purely strategic motives. It is not our intention to deny 
strategic motivations in general behind the acquisition of such patents. 
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2.2 Competitor blocking and the strategic value of patents 
Besides the acquisition of valuable technological assets that might complement the 
existing technology portfolio or that serve as a basis for revenue creation, another 
objective for M&A transactions has been identified – enhancing the position of the 
merged entity in technology competition (Cassiman et al., 2005). By pooling 
technological assets, the merged entity is in a position to create significant barriers to 
entry into particular technology lines or to break down existing patent fences. In other 
words, patents can be used to block competitors from developing a competing 
alternative technology (Heeley et al., 2007; Grimpe and Hussinger, 2008) or to 
remove existing patent fences. Besides the exploitation-related characteristics of 
patents, existing patents can block successive patent applications by threatening their 
novelty requirements (Scotchmer, 1991; Shapiro, 2001; Jaffe and Lerner, 2004; 
Ziedonis, 2004). This section shifts the emphasis to this second face of technology 
acquisition. 
There has been a surge in patent applications worldwide over the past decade. This 
surge has not been accompanied by a proportional increase in R&D investment but by 
an increase in the number of legal disputes over patent rights (Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 1997). Against this background, survey evidence for the US and 
Europe has shown that the protection of intellectual property, i.e. the original 
conception of patents as a means of providing incentives to innovate by granting the 
inventor a temporary monopoly on her invention, is often not the most attractive thing 
about patents (Arundel et al., 1995; Cohen et al., 2000). Instead, the value of patents 
is determined by their importance as bargaining chips in the market for technologies, 
e.g. in licensing and M&A negotiations, and by their potential to block the inventions 
of competitors. A recent survey for Germany shows that more than 40 percent of 
patenting firms apply for patents in order to block competitors (Blind et al., 2007). 
Blind et al. (2007) find particularly striking evidence of “defensive blocking” through 
patenting. They define this as a forward-looking protection strategy directed at 
protecting the firm’s position in technology markets. Such a strategic use of patents 
can lead to patent fences, i.e. where one or a few firms own a number of substitute 
patents (Cohen et al., 2000; Schneider, 2008), or to overlapping complementary 
intellectual property rights, i.e. if many different inventors patent marginal inventions 
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and/or if the granted patents are defined too broadly in terms of the protected 
technology.  
Obviously, acquiring firms will have a strong interest in technologies that have a 
blocking potential. Acquirers might find themselves in a situation where their own 
R&D activities are hindered as they are confronted with existing patent fences. The 
strategic importance of being able to continue with these R&D activities will 
presumably be higher when considerable (sunk) investments have already been made 
in a particular technology line, when major products or services offered by the firm 
depend on the further development of a particular technology or when firms want to 
diversify into a promising product market. Conversely, acquirers might want to build 
up their own blocking potential against undesired competition. Transaction cost 
theory suggests that simple market contracts do not safeguard technology investments 
properly as IPRs are specific assets that cannot be redeployed to the next best use 
without significant loss due to the transaction costs incurred. Therefore, it is 
especially beneficial for firms to take control over potentially blocking technologies 
in order to safeguard their own R&D investment. As a result, our fourth hypothesis 
reads: 
Hypothesis 4: The price paid for an acquisition target increases with the blocking 
potential of the target’s patents.  
Moreover, we hypothesize that acquiring firms will have a particular interest in those 
target patents that have a blocking potential and that are closely related to the 
technology employed by the acquirer. This interaction represents the situation that, on 
the one hand, acquirers might want to “un-block” their own R&D activities or that, on 
the other hand, acquirers might want to create a particularly strong patent fence. From 
a transaction cost perspective, we can argue that blocking patents in particular can be 
better exploited if they are owned by one firm rather than by multiple firms. If two (or 
more) patents hinder each other’s exploitation, the welfare gain that would be 
expected due to decentralization will no longer be possible. This means that if patent 
owners act independently without taking into account the positive effects their 
inventions might have if combined with other firms’ patents, the total potential value 
of exploiting the patents may not be realized. Since firms strive for higher margins 
from their technological assets, we would expect them to prefer to acquire patent 
portfolios with the potential to block their own R&D activities. The higher value of 
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such patents should be reflected in the acquisition price. This leads to our final 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: The price for an acquisition target with blocking patents that are 
closely related to the acquirer’s technology is higher than for a target without these 
patents.  
In conclusion, we argue that technological assets of a potential target firm are a major 
driver for the price paid in the market for corporate control. In the next section we 
present our empirical model to test our theoretical considerations. 
3 Methods 
3.1 Empirical Model 
In our empirical model we explain the deal value of the acquisition, i.e. the price paid 
by the acquirer, on the basis of the target firm’s assets and characteristics. As outlined 
above, our main focus is on the contribution the two functions of patents make to the 
deal value paid by the acquiring firm. We define the acquired company in a hedonic 
way as a bundle of its characteristics and assets X (Gompers and Lerner, 2000). The 
deal value of the target V is a function of those characteristics X. In the presence of 
efficient markets and full information V(X) would equal the price at which the target 
firm’s assets are traded. In practice, M&As involve a premium above the market 
value of the target’s assets. This reflects that the acquiring firm assumes a higher 
value for certain assets than the market does. Our empirical model then shows how 
the deal value is decomposed with respect to the target firm’s characteristics and 
assets: 
uXfXV += )()(  (1) 
where u is the error term of the empirical model which can be estimated using 
ordinary least squares (OLS). The target’s bundle of characteristics X is defined as its 
total assets, return on assets, total liabilities and firm age. To test our hypotheses on 
the value of technologies we introduce different measures for the target’s 
technological assets: the patent stock, the forward citations that its patents received in 
a five-year window and a measure of the patents’ capability to block other patents. 
Moreover, we include a measure of technological relatedness that is subsequently 
interacted with the measure for blocking patents. The definitions of these measures 
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will be detailed in the following section. Finally, measures for prior acquisition 
experience, as well as industry and year dummies, are included to control for the 
different economic conditions and stock market levels during the period from 1999 to 
2003. All continuous variables reflect the target’s assets and characteristics in the year 
prior to the completion of the acquisition; they are all measured in logarithms to take 
account of their skewed distributions.  
3.2 Data sources and measures 
Our main source of data is the merger and acquisition database ZEPHYR from 
Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing. We identified firms located in Europe that 
were subject to a majority acquisition by a corporate investor in the five-year period 
from 1999 to 2003. We only focus on mergers between firms in the same NACE 2-
digit industry to exclude M&As between firms that serve completely different product 
markets as the value of patents in those acquisitions is not straightforward. Moreover, 
only targets from the manufacturing sector were included, as patents are of minor 
importance for services. Our sample consists of 479 target firms with known deal 
values. Financial information on the firms is taken from Bureau van Dijk Electronic 
Publishing’s Amadeus database. As our main focus is on innovative assets, we linked 
the acquisition targets to their patent history as patent applicants at the European 
Patent Office (EPO). Based on a computer-supported, text-based search algorithm, 
target firms and patent applications were linked to each other using firm names and 
addresses in both databases. Each potential match proposed by the search engine was 
checked manually. 
Focusing on the target’s technological assets, we use different variables to capture 
different aspects of the target companies’ innovative activities. In line with several 
recent papers all measures are based on the EPO patent data. First, we use the patent 
stock (PS) to proxy the number of technologies the firm owns, which is calculated as 
follows: 
ttt nsapplicatiopatentPSPS  )1(1 +−= − δ  (2) 
 14
where δ represents the constant knowledge depreciation rate, which is set to 15 
percent as is standard in the literature (e.g., Hall, 1990).3 This variable is used to test 
the importance of the quantity of patents held by the target company for the acquirer 
(Hypothesis 1). The second variable is the citation rate, which describes the value of 
the acquired firm’s patent portfolio proxied by the sum of citations the patents 
received in a five-year window after the patent publication date (Hypothesis 2). Patent 
citations have frequently been shown to be a reliable measure of patent quality and 
value (Trajtenberg, 1990; Harhoff et al., 2003; Harhoff et al., 2005b). Patents receive 
citations when subsequent patents make reference to relevant prior art during the 
patent application process. The more frequently a patent is cited by other patents, the 
higher is its presumable importance. The citations are called forward citations because 
they occur after the patent has been granted. As the citations a firm receives are highly 
correlated with its patent stock, we divide the number of citations by the number of 
patents for our empirical specification. The estimated coefficient can be interpreted as 
the premium an acquiring firm pays for the value of the target’s patents on top of the 
price paid for the patented technologies themselves. 
The third technology measure we use is a proxy for the potential of patents to block 
other patents (Hypothesis 4). We are interested in identifying those patents that are 
closely enough related to a focal patent to block its exploitation, but still protect 
technologies that are different enough to qualify for patent protection. Figure 1 shows 
a stylized picture of the patentable inventions’ sphere around a focal patent (see 
Scotchmer, 2004, for a similar illustration). In the inner circle around the focal patent 
we find inventions that are too similar to qualify for patent protection. They are not 
patentable because the inventive step between the new technology and the focal patent 
is not big enough. The second circle presents inventions that can be patented as the 
inventive step is big enough. If the new patent cannot be exploited without the right to 
use the focal patent, the focal patent has effectively become a blocking patent. 
Conversely, it is also possible that the new patent could block the focal patent in the 
same way. An example would be the invention of the laser, which was based on the 
invention of the maser. The laser is an enhancement of maser technology. Both 
                                                 
3 Dating patents according to their application date as opposed to the granting date conforms with common 
practice (e.g. Griliches, 1981). The application date has the advantage of being closer to the actual completion of 
the invention. 
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technologies use the same principle to create coherent electromagnetic waves, but the 
maser was for microwaves and the laser was for light. As the maser was protected by 
a broad patent, the first laser patent infringed the maser patent. Nevertheless, the laser 
was granted a patent of its own – much later – as it solved some technical problems of 
the maser (see Scotchmer, 1991, for an in-depth discussion of this example). Finally, 
the outer circle of Figure 1 marks the area of technologies which are patentable and 
do not infringe the focal patent. 
Figure 1: Blocking patents 
 
The blocking potential measure we propose for the empirical implementation is based 
on forward citations, making particular use of the citation system at EPO. For each 
EPO patent application, the patent examiner prepares a so-called “search report” that 
lists all important documents which are considered as prior art. Based on the search 
report a decision is made as to whether a patent application is novel enough to be 
granted. An interesting feature of the EPO search reports is that references to prior art 
are classified according to their importance for the patent filing. Prior art which 
threatens the novelty requirement of the patent application is thus made visible. In the 
search report, references made for individual claims in the patent application are 
marked with an “X” if the invention cannot be considered to be novel or cannot be 
considered to involve an inventive step when the referenced document alone is taken 
into consideration. References are marked with a “Y” if the invention cannot be 
considered to involve an inventive step when the referenced document is combined 
with one or more other documents of the same category, such a combination being 
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obvious to a person skilled in the art (Harhoff and Reitzig, 2001; Harhoff et al., 
2005a2005b). A patent can still be granted (although this is less likely) if it has some 
references classified with X or Y. This can be the case for patent applications with 
several claims. X and Y references may only pertain to single claims and the 
remaining claims can be strong enough to get a (modified) application granted.  
Figure 2 gives a highly simplified overview of the patent application procedure at 
EPO. We assume that patent A and patent B are held by a potential target firm. Both 
patents are cited by an incoming patent application C as prior art. In the example, the 
reference to patent A was made by the applicant while the reference to patent B was 
added by the patent examiner. In contrast to the procedure at the United States Patent 
and Trade Mark Office (USPTO), most references for EPO patent applications are 
added by the patent examiner (about 95 percent) rather than by the applicant. In the 
search report, the patent examiner evaluates the importance of prior art for a particular 
claim by assigning a code letter “X” or “Y” (for a full description see Harhoff et al., 
2005a2005b). We use the sum of X and Y citations that patent A and patent B receive 
in a five-year window to proxy their value as blocking patents. To account for the 
high correlation between citations received and the subset of X or Y citations received 
we normalize this measure by the total number of forward citations. Hence we use the 
percentage of X and Y citations in order to represent the threatening power of the 
patents. Again, in our estimated model the coefficient depicts the premium that 
acquiring firms pay for the blocking potential of the target company’s patents on top 
of what they pay for the patented technologies and their value as measured by 
citations.4 
                                                 
4 Note that all forward citation measures are constructed based on the EPO/OECD patent citation 
database. Patent equivalents, i.e. if a particular invention is patented at two different patent offices, are 
taken into account. If patent equivalents were ignored, the number of forward citations a patent 
receives would be significantly underestimated (Harhoff et al., 2005b). 
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Figure 2: Patent application procedure at the EPO 
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To test for the importance of technological proximity of the patent portfolios of 
acquiring and target firm (Hypothesis 3) we use the proximity measure introduced to 
the patent literature by Jaffe (1986). In order to calculate this measure we determine 
patent stocks for each firm, categorized into 2-digit technology classes according to 
the International Patent Classification (IPC). This yields a technology vector F for 
each target i and acquirer j, which can be interpreted as their technology portfolio. 
Using these vectors (as a percentage of the total patent stock) technological proximity 
T is now calculated as: 
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where zero represents no overlap of the firms’ patent portfolios and a high value 
indicates a large overlap. To allow for a non-linear relationship between the deal 
value and technological proximity, we also use a squared term of the proximity 
measure in our empirical model. 
To test hypothesis 5 we define a binary variable that equals one if technological 
proximity between the M&A partners is larger than zero and the target firm owns 
patents with a blocking potential. For all other constellations the dummy equals zero. 
Sticking to a binary variable is necessary in order to avoid multicollinearity in the 
presence of multiple technology measures. The estimated coefficient of the dummy 
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shows whether blocking patents are more important for acquiring firms which are 
active in technology areas related to the acquisition target.  
Regarding the non-technological assets, we include the following: the total assets; the 
return on assets, defined as the sum of profits earned by the firm and the capital gains 
of assets over the market value of assets in the year prior to the acquisition; the total 
liabilities of the target over total assets; and the age of the target, measured in years. 
Finally, besides industry and year dummies, our regressions control for prior 
acquisition experience. We include a dummy variable that is set to one if the 
acquiring firm acquired at least one firm in the three years before the focal 
transaction. 
4 Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample of target firms, divided into 
patent holders and non-patent holders. All continuous variables except for the deal 
value refer to the year prior to completion of the acquisition. First of all, the 
descriptive statistics show that, on average, firms with EPO patents are significantly 
larger than those without patents. Significant differences can also be found for the 
totals assets, the return on assets and the liabilities over assets while no significant 
differences can be found for the age of the firm or the acquisition experience of the 
acquiring company. In this respect, it is particularly remarkable that patent holding 
firms are less profitable on average than firms without patents. 
Regarding the technological assets of the target, Table 1 shows that acquisition targets 
have a patent stock of almost 42 patents. Every patent receives 0.8 citations on 
average within a five-year window after publication. 17 percent of the firms with a 
patent portfolio receive no citations at all. Further, the descriptive statistics show that 
almost 30 percent of all citations are blocking citations (i.e., X and Y citations). 
Technological proximity is on average 0.021, which means that the “technology 
vectors” of the average target and acquiring firm span an angle of 0.021 degree. Table 
1 further shows that 30 percent of the acquisitions that involve patenting targets are 
related to each other in terms of their patent portfolio. Lastly, 22 percent of those 
acquisitions involve target patents with a blocking potential as measured by a dummy 
that equals one if the target firm’s patent portfolio has a blocking potential. 
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To further explore the relationships between the variables, Table 3 in the appendix 
reports bivariate correlations of our variables. It turns out that both the technological 
and the non-technological assets are positively correlated with the deal value. Besides 
the total assets driving the deal value, the technology measures are positively and 
significantly correlated with the deal value. Based on these findings, hypotheses 1, 2 
and 4 receive support. The relationships will be further explored in the following 
section. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Target Firms  
with EPO patents 
Target Firms  
without EPO patents 
T-Tests 
 90 observations 389 observations 
H0: means are 
significantly 
different 
 Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean difference 
deal value 300.748 601.752 72.807 217.68 -216.187 *** 
total assets 190.533 368.428 92.335 278.731 -97.363 *** 
return on assets -6.425 24.672 0.758 18.080 5.909 *** 
liabilities/assets 0.513 0.265 0.604 0.262 0.073 *** 
age of firm (years) 23.048 23.904 22.892 24.101 -0.458  
acquisition experience of acquiring firm 0.244 0.432 0.193 0.395 -0.043  
patent stock 41.981 114.729    
patent stock/assets 0.950 2.875    
# citations /# patents 0.849 0.761    
# XY citations /# citations 0.280 0.273    
technological proximity 0.021 0.070    
technological proximity > 0 0.300 0.461    
# XY citations *  
technological proximity 0.222 0.418 
 
  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
 
4.2 Multivariate analysis 
Table 2 shows the results from the OLS estimation in three different model 
specifications. Focusing on the value of technologies, the first specification, which 
includes the volume and value of technological assets, suggests that both volume and 
value drive the deal value, which confirms our first and second hypotheses. This 
result remains robust across the three specifications. Apparently, patents have a 
technological value that can be exploited in the merged company or through selling 
the patents after the acquisition. Moreover, patents might work as a signal for the 
technological fitness of a potential target company. In addition, the acquiring firm will 
have the opportunity to redeploy resources and realize the benefits of technology 
complementarities. 
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Furthermore, Table 2 shows that the relatedness of the target firm’s technology 
portfolio is of high importance for the acquiring firm. As expected, the coefficients 
hint at an inverted U-shaped relationship between the relatedness of the technology 
portfolios and the deal value. Acquiring firms are hence willing to pay for 
technological assets that provide opportunities for cross-fertilization. However, the 
deal value is negatively affected when the technology portfolios are too closely 
related. Similar results for the relationship between technology relatedness and 
innovation performance (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006) can therefore be 
extended to the market for corporate control. In fact, the price paid for a target should 
reflect the future innovation potential of the merged entity.5  
Model 2, which takes the value of blocking patents into account, shows that acquiring 
firms are highly interested in securing or enhancing their position in technology 
markets through firm acquisitions. Firms pay a premium for blocking patents on top 
of the price of patent portfolio size, quality and technological relatedness. Therefore, 
hypothesis 4 receives support. Our third model shows a positive and significant 
interaction term, which means that acquiring firms are highly interested in patents that 
have a blocking potential and that are closely related to their own technology base. 
Hypothesis 5 hence receives support. The interaction term captures the separate 
effects from the blocking citations and technological proximity measures. Those 
variables turn insignificant. Including the interaction term in the regression does not 
significantly alter the coefficients discussed above. The results turn out to be robust 
across the three model specifications. 
Moving away from the variables used to test the hypotheses, we can see that the 
results provide some interesting insights regarding the remaining variables that refer 
to the target’s characteristics and assets. Focusing on total assets, the coefficient is 
positive and significant across all three models. Return on assets has only a rather 
small positive effect on the deal value. Apparently, the higher the profitability of the 
target, the higher the deal value. This makes intuitive sense, as more profitable targets 
provide more opportunities to recover the acquisition price. All other target firm 
characteristics, as well as the acquisition experience of the acquiring firm, turn out to 
                                                 
5 It is worth mentioning that the maximum is paid for targets with a proximity between 0.23 (model 1) and 0.19 
(model 3). This means that the effect of technological proximity is increasing for about 95% of our observations 
and that the decreasing part of the curve reflects only about 5% of our sample. 
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be insignificant. Finally, industry and year dummies are jointly significantly different 
from zero as LR-Chi2 -tests show (Table 2). 
Table 2: Ordinary least squares regression for the logarithm of the deal value 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
 (standard error) (standard error) (standard error) 
patent stock/assets 0.174 *** 0.152 ** 0.155 ** 
 (0.066)  (0.068)  (0.067)  
# citations /# patents 0.143 *** 0.118 ** 0.125 ** 
 (0.054)  (0.049)  (0.050)  
# XY citations /# citations   0.792 ** 0.614  
   (0.395)  (0.405)  
technological proximity 8.430 *** 7.320 ** 3.110  
 (3.015)  (3.046)  (3.740)  
(technological proximity)2 -18.471 *** -15.657 ** -8.378  
 (6.337)  (6.576)  (8.064)  
dummy (# XY citations &      0.704 ** 
technological proximity)     (0.338)  
log(total assets) 0.526 *** 0.513 *** 0.502 *** 
 (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.046)  
return on assets 0.012 *** 0.012 *** 0.012 *** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
liabilities/assets 0.016  0.030  0.027  
 (0.280)  (0.279)  (0.278)  
log(age of firm)  0.087  0.088  0.087  
 (0.076)  (0.076)  (0.076)  
acquisition experience of  0.135  0.100  0.109  
the acquiring firm (0.188)  (0.184)  (0.186)  
Constant 4.680 *** 4.792 *** 4.914 *** 
 (0.616)  (0.619)  (0.622)  
8 industry dummies LR-Chi2 = 14.13* LR-Chi2 = 14.17* LR-Chi2 = 15.38** 
4 year dummies LR-Chi2 = 16.84*** LR-Chi2 = 17.89*** LR-Chi2 = 18.16*** 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
We use heteroscedasticity-consistent Huber/White standard errors, which are clustered to account for 
multiple acquisitions by the same acquirer.   
 
Our results have shown that technology acquisitions clearly have two faces: one 
directed at acquiring valuable technology that can be used in combination with 
existing technology to build the acquirer’s technology portfolio; and another that is 
directed at improving the position of the acquiring firm in technology markets through 
accumulating technologies that have the potential to block competitor technologies or 
to unlock blocked technologies. Acquiring firms obviously succeed in identifying the 
technology employed by a target company. They are found to pay higher prices for 
targets with valuable technological assets. In other words, acquirers seem to have 
developed the necessary absorptive capacity for identifying valuable technologies. 
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Our results have demonstrated that the technological content and the opportunity to 
exploit protected knowledge in combination with one’s own knowledge stocks are of 
great importance. Acquirers strive to complement their own technology portfolio by 
redeploying technological resources in order to increase their own innovative 
capabilities (Cassiman et al., 2005; Hussinger, 2005; Sorescu et al., 2007).  
Moreover, patents with a blocking potential are particularly interesting for acquirers. 
This result becomes more pronounced when the blocking potential is interacted with 
the technology relatedness of the acquiring and target firms. Having control over a 
concentrated pool of key technologies safeguards R&D investments of the merged 
firm. Acquiring firms hence deliberately select targets with patents that could, on the 
one hand, be used to extend their present R&D activities into areas that were 
previously blocked by competitors and, on the other hand, provide a basis to protect 
and secure the firm’s own technology domains. Patents in such acquisitions therefore 
always serve not only a technological but also a strategic objective in technology 
markets.  
5 Conclusion and future research 
This paper has developed a way of looking beyond the broad technology acquisition 
motive behind M&As. Drawing on transaction cost literature and the resource-based 
view of the firm, we have argued that there are two faces of technology acquisition. 
The first focuses on the resource-based motivations for technology acquisitions. The 
second is a purely strategic dimension, which abstracts from the size- and content-
dominated dimensions typically used to describe a firm’s patent portfolio, and instead 
maps its blocking potential. Empirical evidence from a sample of 479 European 
M&As has shown that firms are paying a significant premium for a patent portfolio 
with blocking potential. Such a technology acquisition can be useful or even 
necessary to the acquirer for two reasons. On the one hand, the acquiring firm can 
acquire patents which are blocking its own ongoing R&D, or remove an existing 
patent fence. On the other hand, the acquiring firm might strive to own patents with 
blocking potential, in order to enhance its position in technology markets by creating 
patent fences and entry barriers into the technology market itself. In line with 
predictions from transaction cost theory, our results suggest that firms strive for 
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central control over a portfolio of important and potentially blocking patents in order 
to safeguard their R&D investments. 
This research contributes to work in the field in several ways. First, our results extend 
existing knowledge on the motivation for firm acquisitions. For the first time, the two 
key functions of patents – as building and as blocking instruments – are shown to be 
reflected in the market for corporate control. In particular, the deliberate acquisition of 
patents with a blocking potential by acquiring firms has a significant impact on the 
allocation of technological assets in the market. This may hint at a concentration of 
key technologies through acquisitions if the acquiring firm accumulates patents to 
block others. Conversely, it may show that firms acquire blocked technologies and 
that M&As hence lead to less concentration in technology markets.  
This finding is particularly relevant for competition policy. It is often argued that 
M&A transactions are carried out with the intention of creating barriers to entry in 
specific technology markets and, hence, decreasing competition. This would however 
not necessarily be the case if an acquisition led to a “hole in a patent fence”. Merger 
control authorities should therefore have an eye on the concentration of key 
technologies in the market and distinguish between firms with blocking patents and 
others. In case of a concentration of patents with a blocking potential through a 
merger the competition authority should consider remedies such as compulsory 
licensing. An example for this is the merger of Pfizer and Pharmacia that was only 
allowed under significant conditions and divestures including compulsory licensing of 
their patented technologies to third parties (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2003). In case of a resolution of a blocked technology portfolio through 
a merger, competition authorities might prefer to refrain from taking action if a joint 
control over the technology portfolios is beneficial. This could be the case if the 
acquired blocked or blocking technology is related to the technology portfolio of the 
acquiring firm. From a transaction cost perspective, the merger in such cases can lead 
to a welfare enhancing use of the joint patent portfolio as it puts an end to mutual 
blocking and obviates the transaction costs of potential licensing contracts. In line 
with predictions from transaction cost theory, decentralized control over such patents 
might lead to suboptimal individual exploitation of the two separate technology 
portfolios. Although this result holds for complementary goods in general, it is more 
pronounced in technology markets due to the sometimes blurry definition of patents, 
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the fact that they often overlap and hence block each other, and that technology 
markets are characterized by a high degree of fragmentation and many uncertainties. 
Because of these specific features of technology markets standard contracts are 
complicated by hold-up problems and thus often difficult to realize, which makes 
centralization of technologies under one controlling party an attractive alternative to 
arm’s-length contracts for firms. 
In order to distinguish between technology accumulation and the unlocking of a 
blocked technology through M&As, competition authorities would have to develop a 
set of criteria defining key technologies and distinguishing them from blocked or 
blocking technologies. As compared to the identification of entry barriers into product 
markets created through M&As, the identification of such barriers in technology 
markets is not straightforward due to the characteristics of technology markets 
mentioned above. Our study suggests an indicator for the blocking potential of firms 
involved in M&As. The measure can be calculated based on patent examination 
reports at the EPO. Nevertheless, it has to be clarified that this indicator can only give 
an indication to help identify firms with blocking patents. The use of such an indicator 
cannot replace interviews with industry experts as not all technologies are patented 
and there might be some noise in patent citation based measures. 
Lastly, our study has some important implications for the technology strategy of 
firms. Firms need to keep a careful eye on the key technologies in their industry and 
identify the underlying IPR, as reorganization in the industry through M&A 
transactions could be directed at a concentration of key technologies or blocking 
technologies. As acquiring firms do not only aim at the acquisition of valuable 
patents, but also pay a significant premium for patents with a blocking potential, the 
redeployment of technologies through M&As may result in a powerful basis to 
threaten the other firms’ future R&D activities. As a consequence, firms should shape 
their M&A strategy in close connection to their IPR strategy. Moreover, the M&A 
strategy could be complemented by forward-looking efforts to identify technologies to 
be licensed-in, to avoid being deterred from continuing R&D activities. 
In case of an M&A between large firms, outsider firms can be assumed to have a 
good appraisal of the technological capacity of the newly merged entity, thanks to 
their own absorptive capacity. However, if smaller firms are involved in acquisitions 
or if acquisitions across industries occur the future technological capacity of the 
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merged entity in technology markets is much more difficult to assess. In such cases, a 
closer look at the acquired firms’ patent portfolio might provide further insights. 
Based on the measure for the blocking potential of firms suggested here, outsider 
firms are in a position to evaluate potential threats of entry barriers in technology 
markets through M&As with less well-known partners.  
In a similar vein, our measure for blocking potential can be used by managers and 
researchers beyond M&As to assess the blocking potential of actors in technology 
markets. This study focused on M&As as an example to study the two faces of 
technology. Our approach is, however, much broader and can be used to analyze 
technologies in many different scenarios. It may provide managers and researchers 
with an overview of “who competes with whom” in technology markets. Compared to 
alternative measures of competition and infringement in technology markets such as 
litigations and oppositions6 (only at the EPO), blocking citations occur at a much 
earlier stage of the patenting procedure, i.e. after patent application. Significant 
opposition costs, consisting largely of lawyers’ salaries, and much higher litigation 
costs (Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004) lead to a low opposition rate and an even lower 
litigation rate in the US (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001) and in Europe (Cremers, 
2008, for Germany). In fact, it has been shown that oppositions are only a good 
measure for competition in some industries (Hall and Harhoff, 2004). Citations at the 
EPO, however, are added in the patent examination process and hence potentially 
infringing patents can be identified at a very early stage of the patent application 
procedure, without incurring any additional costs for the patent holder or potential 
infringer.7 Hence, we argue that blocking citations are potentially the most powerful 
patent-based competition measure.  
The measure for the blocking potential of patents exploits an institutional feature of 
the EPO, the search report, which is taken out by the patent examiners for each 
particular patent application. In contrast, patent applicants at the USPTO have the 
“duty of candor”, which means that the applicant herself has to deliver a list of 
relevant prior art. The search report at EPO, financed by higher application fees for 
                                                 
6 Oppositions constitute patent validity claims before court (see Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004, for details). They are 
supposed to make the European patent system more efficient than the US patent system as they are not costly for 
the opponents in contrast to litigations (Hall and Harhoff, 2004). 
7 Hall and Harhoff (2004) have shown that patents with more patent references to prior art threatening their 
novelty are more likely to be opposed after granting. 
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EPO patents than for USPTO patents, does not only increase the quality of European 
patent grants though a more careful validity check, but also increases transparency in 
technology markets for actors in technology markets. 
Our findings are not without limitations. First, our study might not reveal the full 
importance of blocking patents in M&As. This is because M&As that would have 
created very significant market power in technology markets might have been blocked 
by competition authorities. The implication for our analysis is that the predicted 
importance of blocking patents we found has to be understood as the lower bound of 
the importance of these patents.8 Second, like any other patent based measure, our 
citation measure is subject to industry differences in the likelihood of patenting. In 
some industries we observe a higher fraction of unpatented inventions than in other 
industries (Mansfield, 1986). Also, so far, this measure can be only applied to EPO 
patents as the EPO publishes an examination report indicating the importance of 
references to patented prior art. Third, in this study we cannot distinguish between the 
motive of acquiring blocked technologies, i.e. overcoming existing patent fences, and 
the motive of acquiring patent portfolios with a blocking potential to erect barriers to 
entry into technology markets. This would be an important distinction to make. 
However, we are convinced that this distinction can be best analyzed through case 
studies rather than through large sample studies, as it requires an in-depth knowledge 
of the technologies involved.  
                                                 
8 We are grateful to Ambarish Chandra and Andrea Günster for pointing this out. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 3: Bivariate correlations 
Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
1. log(deal value) 1.000                   
2. log(total assets) 0.501 *** 1.000                 
3. return on assets 0.066  -0.128 *** 1.000               
4. liabilities/ assets -0.087 * -0.026  -0.158 *** 1.000             
5. log(age of firm) 0.086 * 0.053  0.111 ** -0.069  1.000           
6. patent stock/ assets 0.111 *** -0.106 ** 0.100 ** -0.049  0.044  1.000         
7. # citations/# patents 0.188 *** 0.122 *** -0.041  -0.030  0.107 ** 0.061  1.000       
8. #XY citations/# citations 0.213 * 0.183 *** -0.085 * -0.104 ** 0.033  0.194 *** 0.236 *** 1.000     
9. technological proximity 0.084  0.084 * -0.106 ** -0.089 ** -0.013  -0.010  0.178 *** 0.111 *** 1.000   
10. (technological proximity)2 0.036  0.052  -0.077 * -0.079 * -0.008  -0.007  0.156 *** 0.056  0.922 *** 1.000 
11. acquisition experience 0.015  0.006  -0.116 *** -0.004  -0.003  0.005  -0.037  0.093 ** 0.046  0.069 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
 
